Abstract-We study the efficiency and complexity of a distrib-design and analyze spectrum usage strategies [16] , [17] . This uted spectrum allocation algorithm using explicit user coordi-type of sharing refers to non-collaborative sharing where users nation. Users self-organize into coordination groups and adjust are rational (and competitive) 
I. INTRODUCTION
predefined system utility.
The problem of spectrum management can be reduced into Wireless spectrum is a finite and scarce resource. To a variant of the graph coloring problem [3] , [18] , which achieve efficient spectrum usage, future wireless devices will is NP-hard. Given a small fixed network topology, existing use cognitive radios [8] , [15] to dynamically access locally approaches have proposed good heuristics based on centralized available spectrum. Many have advocated for Open Spectrum systems to obtain conflict free spectrum assignments that Systems [1] , [13] where cognitive radios become secondary closely approximate the global optimum. In this case, a server devices and opportunistically access unused licensed spectrum, collects information of user demand and assigns spectrum to a all without disrupting operations of any existing license own-limited number of users to maximize system utility. However, ers, i.e. primary users.
when network topology, user demand and available spectrum The key challenge in dynamic spectrum access networks is at users change, the system needs to completely recompute how to maintain efficient spectrum sharing among (secondary) spectrum assignments for all users after each change, resulting users. We hereby refer to secondary users as users. While in high computational and communication overhead. This maximizing spectrum utilization is the primary goal, we also costly operation needs to be repeated frequently to maintain need a good sharing mechanism to provide fairness across utilization and fairness. users. A user seizing spectrum without coordinating with
In this paper, we consider a distributed approach to spectrum others can cause harmful interference to its neighbors and allocation that can potentially address the coexistence of a hence reduce spectrum utilization. large number of users, while quickly adapting to network dyDesign of dynamic spectrum access networks can be divided namics. Our previous work [4] proposes a distributed coordinainto two types: power based spectrum sharing where users use tion algorithm where users affected by network dynamics selfthe same spectrum band but transmit at different powers to organize into coordination groups and adapt their spectrum minimize interference [6] , [9] , [10] ; and channel sharing where usage to approximate the new optimal conflict free assignment. users transmit at orthogonal channels to avoid interference. While the work in [4] focuses on algorithm design, in this The mechanisms for channel sharing can be further divided paper we propose to study end-user performance analytically into two categories.
in terms of spectrum efficiency and communication overhead.
(1) System-utility driven -Users share spectrum to maxi-In particular, we derive a theoretical lower bound on the mize a predefined system utility [2] , [3] , [4] , [11] , [18] , [19] , minimum amount of spectrum each user can get from co- [22] . This type of sharing also refers to collaborative sharing ordination, and a theoretical upper bound of the algorithm where users have signed agreements or are deployed by the convergence time. We then perform network simulations to same service providers to maximize system wide performance verify our analytical results under different network settings. regardless of individual benefits.
The key contributions of this paper are two-fold: (2) Self-gain driven -Users share spectrum to maximize Analytical Bounds on Distributed Coordination Perforself-benefit. Existing works have applied game theory to mance and Complexity. We derive a theoretical lower bound on the amount of spectrum each user can get from nterferqnce range physical topology the proposed distributed coordination, referred to optimal allocation problem to a variant of a graph multi-should not use the same spectrum concurrently. The example coloring problem and describe previous solutions.
of Figure 1 reduces to one triangle (A,B,C) and one link (D,E).
The corresponding spectrum management problem is to A. Problem Model and Utility Functions color each vertex using a number of colors from its color list, We consider the case where the collection of available and find the color assignment that maximizes system utility. spectrum ranges forms a spectrum pool, divided into non-The coloring is constrained by that if an edge exists between overlapping orthogonal channels. We assume a network of N any two distinct vertices, they can't be colored with the same users indexed from 0 to N-I competing for M spectrum color. Most importantly, the objective of coloring is to maxchannels indexed 0 to M -1. Each user can be a transmission imize system utility. This is different from traditional graph link or a broadcast access point. Users select communication coloring solutions that assign one color per vertex. Notice that channels and adjust transmit power accordingly to avoid inter-the solution to this graph coloring problem is to maximize fering with primaries. The channel availability and throughput system utility for a given graph, i.e. a given topology and for each user can be calculated based on the location and channel availability. This characterizes the optimal solution the channel usage of nearby primaries. The spectrum access for a static environment.
problem becomes a channel allocation problem, i. e. to obtain a B. Existing Spectrum Management Solutions conflict free channel assignment for each user that maximizes system utility.
The optimal coloring problem is known to be NP-hard [7] .
System utility. In this paper, we assign spectrum to users to Existing efforts lead to efficient algorithms that closely approxmaximize the following fairness based utility function:
imate the optimum spectrum allocation for a given network topology. where A {am,n, 0 < m < M-1, 0 < n < N-1} denotes a framework to use iterative bidding to maximize the expected spectrum allocation, am,n 1 denotes that spectrum band m revenue. They use exhaustive search to derive the optimal is assigned to user n, and zero otherwise, and bm,n represents channel allocation for a small number of users. The work in the maximum bandwidth/throughput that user n can acquire [3] , [2] , [19] proposed the use of regional server model, and through using spectrum band m (assuming no interference developed several heuristics based centralized approximations from other neighbors). for a limited number of users. Results in [18] , [23] show Conflict graphs. Conflict graphs have been widely used that the heuristic based algorithms perform similarly to the to characterize interference constraints [3] , [12] , [14] , [18] , global optimum (derived off-line for simple topologies), and [20] , [19] . We start from an illustrative example in Figure 1 the centralized and distributed algorithms perform similarly. where users A to F are for example access points that provide Further, the work in [21] proposed a hybrid pricing model -use network access for their subscribers. Since A, B and C are simple auctions during peak period with a reserved price while located closely to each other, their subscribers will receive sig-applying a uniform price to all buyers during off-peak. Finally, nals from all three APs. Signals from non-associated APs are another approach uses power based allocations and applies , example with one buyer and four sellers, and an one-to-one coordination.
We have shown in [4] that the effectiveness of one-toone coordination is limited by the number of exchangeable <=2 \LLLYchannels, and it can lead to node starvation. We then develop Fig. 2 Figure 3 illustrates an example where the conflict graph is a chain price-driven power control to minimize interference [9] . In topology consisting of three nodes A, B, and C. Node B is not this case, all buyers use the same spectrum band.
assigned with any channel and the system utility is zero. We refer to this as user starvation. Node A and B cannot modify III. DISTRIBUTED COORDINATION FRAMEWORK their spectrum usages due to the constraint from C, while node In [4] we propose a distributed spectrum allocation frame-B and C also cannot coordinate due to the constraint from A. work using explicit coordination. Coordination involves sets However, by allowing A and C to give up channel 1 at the of neighboring nodes (vertices in the conflict graph), each same time and feed it to B, we can remove the starvation at B.
of which form a connected component of the conflict graph, To achieve this, we propose a special one-buyer-multi-seller self-organize into coordination groups. Each group modifies coordination, called Feed Poverty where if a node (buyer) spectrum assignment within the group to improve system has very poor channel assignment, the neighboring nodes can utility while ensuring that the change in spectrum assignment collaborate together to feed it with some channels. does not require any change at other nodes outside the group Next, we limit the coordination to be self-contained. In (due to interference constraints). particular, coordination in each group will not disturb the To initiate a coordination, any node who wants to improve spectrum assignment at nodes outside the group. Hence, after its spectrum assignment first broadcasts a request to its neigh-the coordination, the modified channel assignment should bors who are in the interference range. These neighbors are not lead to any conflict with nodes outside the group. This connected to the node in the conflict graph. Neighbors willing helps to maintain system stability, so that a coordination to participate reply to the requester and form a coordination may not invoke a series of reactions due to violations in group. Because any two connected nodes in a conflict graph interference constraints. More importantly, this guarantees that may not communicate directly, they can exchange coordination if a coordination improves the utility in a local area, it also messages via multi-hop routing, or by using a dedicated con-improves the system utility. Or in other words, a local imtrol channel with higher power and hence larger transmission provement will lead to a system improvement. We enforce this range.
constraint by restricting exchangeable channels, and isolating any concurrent coordination groups. In particular, each node A. Regulated Coordination for Fast System Convergence can only participate in at most one coordination group at To perform coordination, we must first determine the size any time, and the members of any two coordination groups and membership of distributed coordination groups. Large can not be directly connected. Fig. 2 shows an example of groups increase the complexity of coordination due to high isolation between coordination groups. Details of coordination synchronization and communication costs. In addition, in-process can be found in [4] . It should be noted that while teractions might occur between coordination groups if they the coordination algorithm is simple, implementing it in real share neighboring users. Careless coordination will lead to systems requires an efficient protocol to form groups and conflicts among concurrent coordination groups, and cascading exchange information. This is an important topic and we plan effects that prevent system from converging. To facilitate to address it in a future study. coordination, we propose several constraints to regulate the procedure and avoid cascading effects that lead to system B. FC-Optimal Assignment instability [4] .
We combine one-to-one Fairness Coordination and Feed First, we limit the size of coordination groups to one-Poverty Coordination into a Fairness Coordination with Feed to-one coordination and one-buyer-multi-seller coordination. Poverty (FC). Each node who wants to improve its spectrum In this case, coordinating around a central leader per group usage starts with one-to-one Fairness Coordination with its neighbors to improve system utility. If there is no exchangenon-starved. We re-index these neighbors as (0, dable channels, a poor node can broadcast a Feed-Poverty re-1). quest to its neighbors to initialize Feed Poverty Coordination.
For a user n, we can represent the spectrum assignment Overall, a channel assignment A is said to be FC-optimal if matrix A using the following (i. e. column 0, 1, , d(n) -1, n) since they represent the Theorem 1: Under a FC-optimal assignment A, for each channel assignment at user n's conflicting neighbors. From vertex n in the conflict graph G, 0 < n < N-1, its throughput (3) we can derive R(n) is lower-bounded: 
Proof: We prove the theorem by contradiction, that is we M=o M=o R(i) assume the bound (2) doesn't hold for node n under a FCoptimal assignment, i.e.
So Rmi i=O Rm i =d.
Further we can show that for column n,
Next, we will show that user n can request a Feed Poverty 
Combining (9) with (8), we have By combining (12) and (13) into (11), we get
S Rmo,i < 1, and
i=O Rmo,i < 1, 0 < ti < d -1.
The above results show that the system utility increases after the feeding, which contradicts with the assumption that This demonstrates that mo is not the only channel assigned to assignment A is FC-optimal. each neighbor i. Hence, after giving up channel mo to user n, U every neighbor has at least one additional channel remains.
Theorem 1 shows that the lower bound of each user's Next, we need to compute the system utility after user n throughput depends on its interference condition. First, the is being fed by channel ino, which depends on the spectrum bound of user n scales inversely with the number of conflicting assignment before the feeding. There are two possibilities: neighbors of n, that is, users get less spectrum in crowded Type 1: R(n) 0. From (10), the feeding will increase areas than in sparse areas. This scaling provides an immediate R(n) to bm0,n without starving any neighbor (O to d-1). Sntuition of faicess.
Clearly, the system utility is improved from -oo if Second, the bound scales linearly with the node's total n is the only starved user in the network before the available throughput B(n). If a user improves its channel feeding. However, when there are multiple starved users, bandwidth using sophisticated physical layer techniques, withthe system utility remains -oc. In this case, we modify out changing its interference condition, the throughput bound the definition o improving system utilitytoincludincreases linearly, but the number of assigned channels rereducing the number of starved users and increasing the mains the same. Hence, the proposed strategy will not favor resutili tye ofe nonstarved users.aThrough.asimilar users in good channel conditions and starve users in bad faimess utility of non-starved users. Through a similar channel conditions. process, we can continue the remove other starved users and further improve system utility. in real systems where a vertex is entitled to request coordi-system, which does not necessarily mean that the complexity nation if its current throughput is below its poverty line. We of the system will scale in a 0(N2) trend in practice.
refer to this as the poverty guided coordination.
Actually as we observed in our simulation (Section V-D), the Further, we can show that if channels are fully available complexity of the system scales linearly as the number of at each vertex, i.e. IL(n)l = M, a FC-optimal assignment nodes increases.
can eliminate user starvation if the number of channels M > A + 1, where A is the maximum degree in the graph A = V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS maxo<n<N d(n). This matches to the well-known conclusion in graph coloring where the chromatic number of a graph is We conduct experimental simulations to quantify the perforat most A\ + 1 [5] .
mance of coordination-based spectrum allocation and validate Theorem 3: The poverty line bound in Theorem 2 is tight, the theoretical lower bounds. For default scenarios, we assume for several types of network topology. clique, ring star, and that channels are equally weighted and all the channels are chain, available for each node, i.e. In,m = 1, bn,m = 1. We assume This can be shown by individual case studies, and hence that all active nodes have backlogged traffic. we omit the proof due to space constraints. For randomly
We assume a network of many WiFi and WiMAX access generated, clustered and real-network topologies, we obtain points, referred to as users. We assume each AP serves a large statistical results on the tightness of the bound using experi-number of subscribers and have backlogged traffic. We use ments in Section V-B.
a simple binary interference model to construct the conflict graph -two users conflict if they are within distance of D. By C. Upper Bound on Coordination Complexity default, we set D to lOOm. We use this assumption to simplify Using Poverty guided coordination, only users with spec-the conflict graph construction. However, it will not limit the trum assignment less than their poverty line can initiate a scope of the proposed coordination framework. To examine the coordination. The requestor n can sequentially select the best impact of network topology, we use both randomly generated channels that provide the highest improvement to system topologies and measured AP deployment traces. utility, and negotiate with the neighboring nodes to get these * Random network. We place users randomly in an area. channels at one time. Following the detailed proof of Theorem * Clustered network. We simulate a hotspot scenario by 2, we can show that after each coordination iteration, n's specdeploying a set of users densely in a small area of the trum assignment will reach its poverty line. This also allows random network. We use this topology to examine the us to derive an upper bound on the number of coordination impact of conflict degree on system performance. iterations needed to reach a system equilibrium.
. Real network trace. We extract a set of actual AP Theorem 4: In a system with N nodes, with uniform chandeployments using data traces collected by Placelab nel bandwidth, the poverty guided coordination will reach (http://www.placelab.org/).
an equilibrium after an expected number of at most O(N2) ( p p g ) iterations. By optimizing the order of coordination, the system In sltedscenarios, ecrandomly deploy primary users can reach an equilibrium in at most N iterations.
and introduce dynamics to spectrum availability at each node. Proof: We denote a user as "satisfied" if it is on or above We also introduce heterogeneous channel bandwidth and exits poverty line, otherwise "unsatisfied". First we present a key amine the impact on the tightness of poverty line. We use property of the poverty guided coordination (PGC):
these simple scenarios to demonstrate the impact of network Property 1: In a coordination iteration in which channels dynamics and examie the system convergence tme and are feeded to n, if a neighbor m1 is converted from "satisfied" coordination overhead. to "unsatisfied", then PL(n) < PL(mi). (proof in AppenWe use two metrics to evaluate the performance. dix B)
System utility -We consider fairness defined in (1). Note From property 1, if the PGC can be conducted such that the that if there exists a user with no channel assigned, the utility user with lowerpoverty line among its (one-hop) neighborhood becomes-coo. For better representation, we modify the utility to U(A) = H/jQo1RA(n) and U(A) = 0 if there is any RA(n) =0. centralized graph-coloring approach of [18] . We randomly deploy 40 links with 30 channels in a given area and produce the corresponding conflict graph. In this case, the proposed distributed coordination scheme starts from a random allocation and 1200 gradually improves system utility until the system converges.
Centralize Figure 4 compares the system utility and algorithm complexity coordination and random spectrum assignment for various topologies [4] .
B. Tightness of the Poverty Line Bound
We now examine the appropriateness of the user poverty bound derived in Theorem 2. 20% (1) Static Networks - Figure 5 illustrates the histogram of the ratio of the actual user throughput and the poverty _ bound assuming 40 vertices and 100 time slots. Results show 015% that the theoretical bound is valid and fairly tight. Figure 6 shows the CDF of the ratio between actual node throughput and lower bound. We observe that the bound be-is relatively smoother by eliminating the truncation effect in comes slightly looser as the number of primary users increases. Theorem 2. We see that the bound is looser compared to that of This is mainly due to the mismatch between L(n) and d(n). the uniformed bandwidth. This is mainly due to the fact that a We calculate d(n) to include all the interfering neighbors who node's throughput is always strictly larger than the bound. The has at least one channel in common with n. Therefore, d((n) is figure also shows that the bound is sensitive to the variance the upper bound of the conflicting neighbors on each channel. in bandwidth across channels.
(3) Heterogenous Spectrum Bandwidth -When channel bandwidth is non-uniform, we compute the bound following C. Impact of Network Topology Theorem 1. Figure 7 compares the tightness of the bound when Figure 8 (a) illustrates three sample topologies correspondchannel bandwidth varies between 1 to 3 and 1 to 5. The result ing to random, clustered and measured networks, respectively. with the network size, it also scales with the number of a) (/)2.5 0~~~~~~~~channels. However, we could not obtain the relationship of L 2' lthe complexity and the number of channels. We plan to study 1.5 bandwidth from 1 to 3 the individual complexity in a future work. We evaluate the complexity of coordination in large scale Fig. 7 . Tightness of the Poverty Line Bound under heterogeneous channel networks. We measure the total system overhead, i.e. the bandwidth.* total number of message exchanges for a system to reach an equilibrium. We keep the user density constant and vary the Every topology contains 200 nodes, and the number of chan-system scale from 200 to 1000, and assume 20% of node nels is 100. We use 100 channels since most nodes in clustered dynamics, and 20 channels. Results in Figure 9 indicates that and measured networks have degree larger than 30. Note the system overhead (in a random network) scales linearly with that for this experiment the initial allocation is the empty the number of users. Hence, the average overhead per user is allocation. Figure 8 (b) plots the amount of spectrum assigned roughly constant, 8 messages or 2 coordination iterations under to each user using the explicit coordination. We observe that the above system configurations. This result demonstrates the any user n obtains spectrum inversely proportional to its efficiency of the proposed approach. We note that the per-user conflict degree d(n), as characterized by the poverty line overhead is much smaller in this scenario than that in Figure 8 .
definition. This is because we use less number of channels. To further investigate this dependency, we plot in Figure 8(c) the amount of spectrum assigned at each user divided by its poverty line, as a function of the conflict degree d(n). It
In this paper, we study the performance of an adaptive can be observed that in the clustered network and the measured and distributed approach for spectrum sharing in dynamic network, there are three kinds of users: 1) the users in the spectrum networks. In this approach, users self-organize into non-clustered area, which is consistent with the nodes in the coordination groups and adapt their spectrum assignment random network; 2) the users at the clustered area, whose to approximate the global optimal assignment. We perform degrees are high; 3) the users near the edge of the clustered analytical study on each user's spectrum assignment and area, whose conflict degrees are between that of the clustered coordination overhead. We derive a lower bound on each area and the non-clustered area (around [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . The results user's spectrum usage guaranteed by the coordination, referred show that the Poverty Line bound is relatively tighter for to as the poverty line. It represents the level of fairness the first two types of users, and becomes looser for the third enforced by the coordination, and serves as a guideline to type. In other words, the Poverty Line bound is more accurate organize coordination. Experimental results show that the profor homogenous conflict conditions, which coincides with the posed approach performs similarly as the centralized topologytheoretical results where the Poverty Line is tight for the line, optimized approach but with much less complexity. We also clique, and ring topologies, verify the correctness ofthepoverty line under various network settings. While we only proposed a specific coordination strat-APPENDIX egy to maximize fairness based system utility, the proposed A. Lemma 1 and Its Proof coordination framework can be extended towards other utility functions or optimization goal. We intend to examine this in 
